Trade policies such as tariffs are often featured by the prisoner's dilemma. One country's trade liberalization is vulnerable to the opportunism of another country. This problem is more serious in cases where a country behaving opportunistically can only be punished by the victims. In a trade model with three countries, we show that "circular concessions" are the only way to have any Pareto-improving trade liberalization. The circular nature of the concessions implies that if punishment can be carried out only by the victim of opportunistic behavior, multilateral trade liberalization cannot be sustained. Our results have implications for rule design in multilateral trade systems such as the WTO.
Introduction
The GATT/WTO and preferential trade agreements help member countries to achieve further gains from trade by promoting deeper trade liberalization. In general, free trade does not automatically follow from individualistic behavior. A major reason for this has to do with the existence of monopolistic power in trade. 1 Trade liberalization requires that countries behave cooperatively and reciprocally. In certain circumstances, greater cooperation and reciprocity can only be achieved through multilateral trade agreements, as opposed to a web of bilateral trade agreements, 2 and sustained through third-party punishments.
To illustrate, consider three countries: China, Japan, and the United States. The US would be better off if Japan would open its market to US agricultural products. However, in this case, the US has few sectors with which to reciprocate because almost all US markets are already very open to Japanese products. The lack of reciprocity discourages Japan and the US from reaching a bilateral agreement for further trade liberalizations. On the other hand, China can reduce its tariffs on electrical appliances that would help Japan since Japan is a major exporter of these goods in the world, but Japan has few sectors with which to reciprocate. To induce China to reduce tariffs on electrical appliances, the US can phase out its Multifiber Arrangement, which sets export quotas on textile products from China and some other countries, so that China can export more textiles and clothing 1 As shown by Harry Johnson (1953-54) , the optimal tariff for an individual country is generally not zero. Other important arguments for protection include the protection of infant industries and the political economy of trade policies.
2 Multilateralism is not unanimously preferred to bilateralism. For example, Deardorff and Stern (1997) argue that it is more difficult for many countries to reach consensus on trade issues, as compared when two countries are involved. Other examples along this line include Krugman (1991) , Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) , Bagwell and Staiger (1999) and Maggi (1999) .
to the US. As a result, circular concessions may occur and, based on such concessions, a multilateral trade liberalization in three sectors would benefit all three countries.
The above illustration demonstrates an important advantage of multilateral trade agreements over bilateral ones. Such an advantage is created from bilateral imbalances of power, in the sense that one country can make more tariff concessions to another country but not conversely. Thus the former is "more powerful" because it stands to lose less from a bilateral trade war. As shown by Maggi (1999) , in the presence of bilateral imbalances of power, outcomes that are Pareto superior to the ones that are sustainable with bilateral trade agreements can be achieved with multilateral trade agreements and third-party punishment. The reason is simple. With bilateral agreements for deeper trade liberalization, the victim (the less powerful one) is not able to punish the defector (the more powerful one) sufficiently strongly to deter defection. However, with a multilateral trade agreement combined with third-party punishment, the joint punishment would be stronger and so deeper liberalization can be sustained. In the present paper, we explore circumstances in which any Pareto improvement upon the "unilateral subgame-perfect equilibrium" 3 must be supported by a multilateral trade agreement together with third-party punishment. As in Maggi (1999) , this paper provides a rationale for joint punishment by both the victims and nonvictims of defection. However, our paper tries to extend Maggi's (1999) work in several directions as discussed below.
We consider a three-country trade model that is shown to exhibit triangular trade, where a country is a net exporter to another country that in turn is a net exporter to a third country, and this third country in turn is a net exporter to the first one. 4 In Maggi (1999), certain welfare improvements upon the unilateral Nash equilibrium 5 are possible via bilateral trade agreements that do not involve any thirty-party punishment. That is, only more significant improvements require multilateral trade agreements with thirtyparty punishment. We show, in the present paper, that there are situations in which any welfare improvement from the unilateral subgame-perfect equilibrium, small or large, requires a multilateral agreement with third-party punishment. This result is significant as we observe that most multilateral trade liberalizations take place in a gradual fashion. Thus, our result implies that in certain circumstances third-party punishment may be required even when trade liberalization takes place gradually.
In Maggi (1999) , endowments are assigned to the trading countries and so supply is not affected in any way by changes in trade policies. As a result, strategic reactions by firms to changes in a country's trade policies cannot be examined in such a model.
Given the trade policies of all three countries, the first welfare theorem of the general equilibrium theory implies that gains from trade are exhausted by the resulting worldwide competitive equilibrium. Gains from defecting by any country tend to be small under these assumptions. One therefore wonders whether bilateral imbalances of power become stronger or weaker without these assumptions. In the present paper, we relax these assumptions and show that bilateral imbalances of power are not as extreme as they 4 Krugman and Obstfeld (2000, p. 236) point out that some advantageous trade deals inherently involve more than two countries since such bilateral imbalances of power link them together. In particular, they mention the following situation: "The United States sells more to Europe, Europe sells more to Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia sells more to Japan, and Japan sells more to the United States."
5 In Maggi (1999), only the countries behave strategically in deciding the tariffs. Both firms and consumers are competitive. Hence, the model there is basically a one-stage game 6 For a survey of studies on gradual trade liberalization, see Staiger (1995) .
appear to be. Hence, to realize greater gains from trade, punishment by nonvictims or third-parties should not be entirely ruled out.
There are two interesting points associated with the above-mentioned results. First, although it is generally true that collective punishment helps support Pareto-improving multilateral trade liberalizations, we show that there are situations in which the resulting trade patterns make third-party punishment necessary to sustain any Pareto-improving multilateral trade liberalization from the unilateral subgame-perfect equilibrium. Second, with respect to the rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes, the WTO is clearly mute on the possibility of allowing nonvictim member countries to punish a defector. 7 An implication is that more explicit rules regarding third-party punishment may be needed in order to facilitate deeper trade liberalization in some cases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop the model and analyze the value of multilateral trade liberalization. In Section 3, we examine the need for third-party punishment. Concluding remarks are in Section 4.
Pareto-Improving Multilateral Trade Liberalization
Consider a world in which there are three countries and three goods. We call both the countries and the goods 1, 2, and 3. Unless otherwise specified, we distinguish the two sets of names with using a superscript for countries and a subscript for goods. Each country produces two goods but consumes all three of them. Country i produces goods i and i + 1, for i = 1, 2, and 3. When i + j > 3, it will be understood that i + j are modularized by 3. Hence, good i is produced by country i and country i + 2 (see Figure   7 Maggi (1999) argues that nonvictim members of the WTO can punish the defecting government in some subtle ways by withdrawing some of their "goodwill" toward that government. However, this is not included as part of the WTO rules. 
The Unilateral Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium
As the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate an advantage of multilateral trade liberalizations (over bilateral ones) and the necessity of third-party punishment, we focus on a particular trade pattern resulting from the following assumptions on the cost and demand functions:
A1 implies that country i will produce good i but will not import it, because the other producer of the good (i.e., country i+2) has a cost of production which is too high relative to the market demand for the good in country i. Under A2, country i will produce good i +1 and will also import it from country i +1. Finally, A3 implies that country i's market demand for good i +2, which country i does not produce, is strong enough that it imports the good from both countries i + 1 and i + 2. Given the above specifications of the cost and demand functions and hence the above pattern of trade, we can assume, without loss of generality, that country i only considers a tuple, 
where Π i jh (t) denotes country i's profit from selling good h in country j, CS i h (t) denotes country i's consumer surplus from good h, and T R i h (t) denotes country i's tariff revenue from importing good h. They are all evaluated at the Nash equilibrium of the subgame played by the firms worldwide in the second stage led by the tariffs as embodied in t.
9
Parameter λ i > 0 denotes the welfare weight for the total consumer surplus of country i.
Note that the functional forms of the demand functions imply that the markets are not interrelated, in the sense that a change in the price of a good in one place does not affect demand for either of the other two goods in any place. Thus, given t, the second stage Nash equilibrium quantities of the firms without subjecting to the nonnegativity 8 The Most Favored Nation clause of the GATT/WTO is not imposed at this point. That is, tariffs are set on a bilateral basis. 9 The Nash equilibrium in each stage is unique under our specifications of the demand and cost functions.
constraint are given byq
where
jk denotes the quantity of good k produced by country i and sold in country j.
Thus, by substituting (2)- (4) into the weighted welfare functions in (1), simple calculation
shows that the subgame-perfect equilibrium tariffs without subjecting to the nonnegativity constraint are given bŷ
When 1.5 < λ i < 3, A3 and equations (6) and (7) implyt
0. When λ i < 2.5, A2 and equation (5) imply that good i + 1 will be produced in both country i and country i + 1 and it will also be imported by country i from country i + 1.
Hence, as shown in Proposition 1 below, country i imposes a positive tariff only on good i+1 that it imports from country i+1 when 1.5 < λ i < 2.5. The unilateral subgame-perfect equilibrium refers to the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the above two-stage model with the quantities and the tariffs all subject to the nonnegativity constraint.
Proposition 1: Assume A1 − A3 hold and 1.5 < λ i < 2.5. Assume that further negative quantities and tariffs are not feasible. Then t * i (i+1)(i+2) = t * i (i+2)(i+2) = 0 and t * i i+1 > 0 in the unilateral subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Proof: Note first that the separability of the objective function implies that, in the unilateral subgame-perfect equilibrium, the tariff t * i i+1 is determined by maximizing 
), subject to the nonnegativity constraint. By (4), this sum is concave. 10 Hence, it is also concave in any one of the two tariffs holding the other one constant. By (6) and (7), botht 
Pareto-Improving Trade Liberalization
When t * i (i+1)(i+2) = t * i (i+2)(i+2) = 0 and t * i i+1 > 0, which is the unilateral subgame-perfect 10 Recall that in calculating subgame-perfect equilibrium, firms' quantities must be as in (2)- (4), given any tariff collection t. Denote by w i (t) the part of country i's weighted welfare function that will be affected by such trade liberalization in all countries. Then
Let country i reduce its tariff from t * i i+1 by an amount ² i with 0 < ² i 6 t * i i+1 . By (8) , such a trade liberalization in country i causes a reduction in country i's own welfare by the amount ∆w
and an increment in country 11 As noticed before, linearity in cost and demand functions implies that country i's profit from selling good i to country i + 2 does not depend on tariff levels other than t i+2 i . Similarly, a country's consumer surplus and tariff revenue associated with good i + 1 do not depend on tariffs other than t i i+1 . 12 Since the tariff levels before trade liberalization agreements are taken to be those in the unilateral tariff Nash equilibrium, we can write such welfare changes simply as functions of the tariff reductions only.
i + 1's welfare by the amount 
with strict inequality for at least one country.
) are both continuous, monotonically increasing functions of ² i and ² i+2 , respectively. Furthermore, both terms are zero when
Thus, by choosing ² 1 to be sufficiently small, the Intermediate Value Theorem would imply that there are ² 2 < t * 2 3 and ² 3 < t * 3 1 such that
Note also that by assumptions A1 − A2,
holds for λ i ≥ 1 and t i i+1 > 0. Thus, it follows that when ² i is small enough,
13 Our choice of ² 2 depends on ² 1 via functions ∆Π 2 12 (² 1 ) and ∆w 2 3 (² 2 ) together with the Intermediate Value Theorem. Since these functions are continuous and monotonically increasing and since they are both zero when ² 1 = ² 2 = 0, ² 2 is small whenever ² 1 is small. Similarly, ² 3 is small whenever ² 2 is small. Hence, both ² 2 and ² 3 are small enough whenever ² 1 is small enough.
That is, the total net gain from country i's trade liberalization is positive. Together (9) and (10) 
. We have therefore shown the existence of tariff reductions of all three countries that make country 1 better off without making countries 2 and 3 worse off. QED
The circular nature of the concessions as established in Proposition 2 implies that when a country, say country 1, revokes its concession to country 2, country 2 can do no better than to revoke its concession to country 3 in order to avoid double losses.This action inflicts no punishment upon country 1. This means that country 3's punishment, a third-party punishment, has to be in place in order to deter country 1 from defecting.
The possibility of sustaining Pareto-improving trade liberalizations from the unilateral subgame-perfect equilibrium via third-party punishment is studied in the next section.
Sustaining Multilateral Trade Liberalization via Third-Party Punishment
As a direct implication of Proposition 2, country i + 1 does not have any leverage to inflict damage upon country i for defecting on any given Pareto-improving trade liberalization agreement. Thus, country i + 1, the victim of country i's defection, must rely on country i+2 to carry out the needed punishment for deterring country i from defecting on the given agreement. This confirms our early point that in circumstances where trading partners have to make circular concessions, the victimized partner may have to rely on a third-party to punish the defector in order to make the circular concessions self-enforcing.
When trade is infinitely repeated and punishment by third-parties is permissible, a trade liberalization agreement can be sustained by the following strategy of the trading countries, provided that the agreement is Pareto superior to the unilateral subgameperfect equilibrium and that future payoffs are not heavily discounted:
Stick to the agreement in the first period and continue to do so for as long as no country defects. If, however, one country defects by raising its tariffs, set the tariff as in the unilateral subgame-perfect equilibrium.
The above strategy is the trigger strategy which is commonly used in the standard proof of the classic folk theorem, according to which the strategies are self-enforcing (i.e.
they form a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the corresponding infinitely repeated game)
for large enough discount factors. The reader is referred to Gintis (2000, pp. 128-129) as an example. Note also that by reverting to their unilateral subgame-perfect equilibrium tariffs, one country provides a third-party punishment by forcing the defector to pay a higher tariff. In addition, as explained above, a Pareto improvement from the unilateral subgame-perfect equilibrium is not sustainable without third-party punishment.
14 We have thus shown Proposition 3: Suppose trade is infinitely repeated. Then, under the same conditions as in Proposition 1, every Pareto-improving trade liberalization agreement from the unilateral subgame-perfect equilibrium can be sustained via strategies that necessarily involve thirdparty punishment, provided that the discount factor is large enough for each country.
As shown by Proposition 2, circular concessions in terms of trade liberalizations (tariff reductions) are necessary for any Pareto improvement from the unilateral subgame-perfect equilibrium, small or large, so that country i's gain from countryi + 2's concession outweighs the loss of its own concession to country i+1, for i=1, 2, 3. Thus, in our setting, Proposition 3 implies that gains from trade are sustainable when and only when thirdparty punishment is permitted and the trading countries do not heavily discount their future payoffs.
Conclusion
We build a simple model with three countries to show that circular concessions may sometimes be the only way to achieve Pareto-improving trade liberalization. The circular nature of the concessions implies in particular that Pareto-improving trade liberalization must be multilateral. It also implies the necessity for third-party punishment in sustaining Pareto-improving trade liberalization agreements. An implication of the results here is that more explicit rules than those currently governing the settlement of disputes under WTO regarding third-party punishment may sometimes be needed.
The results of this paper are driven by some very specific assumptions. For example, the model is constructed in such a way that the resulting optimal tariffs are negative for two out of three goods in every country. Moreover, different countries impose positive tariffs on different goods. Relaxation of these assumptions will certainly affect our results. However, the basic spirit survives. What we have argued essentially is that in order to realize gains from trade, sometimes what we call "circular concessions" are required in which each country grants concession to one other country but in turn is (more than) compensated by a third country. This type of gain from trade will require third-party punishment for enforcement. Consequently, a multilateral trade relation can realize certain gains from trade that are not achievable through bilateral trade agreements.
on the assumptions discussed above. These assumptions are only used to greatly simplify our technical argument. Our argument is also different from the argument presented by Maggi (1999) , which stresses the improvement of third-party sanctions in enforcing multilateral trade agreement. We are more concerned with the creation of surplus through circular concessions. Although different in spirit, we believe our insight to be a useful complementary argument in favor of multilateral trade relations. 
